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ABSTRACT 
  This Note argues that parents’ fundamental right to direct their 
children’s moral and educational upbringing includes the right to 
exempt their children from objectionable sex education programs in 
public schools. Schools usurp parents’ fundamental rights when they 
unilaterally introduce children to topics of human sexuality without 
parental notice or permission. Alleged violations of these rights merit 
strict scrutiny review from courts. When parents’ objections are 
confined to discrete, tangible events, parents are constitutionally 
entitled to exempt their children from objectionable activities. The 
efficacy of this constitutional relief is more limited, however, when 
parental objections are pervasive and unassociated with a particular 
aspect of the school’s program or curriculum. 
INTRODUCTION 
Public education has deep roots in America.1 The state has an 
interest in ensuring that its citizens receive an education that enables 
them to be productive and useful citizens.2 But the child is not the 
creature of the state, and parents have a fundamental right to direct 
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 1. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 2. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (“Providing public schools ranks 
at the very apex of the function of a State.”); Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (“[E]ducation is perhaps 
the most important function of state and local governments. . . . It is the very foundation of good 
citizenship.”). 
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their children’s educational, moral, and religious upbringing.3 Public 
education creates opportunities for tension between parents and the 
state because each seeks to influence child development. In the 
context of public education, when states make administrative and 
policy decisions to educate students effectively, parents’ individual 
preferences must yield by some degree—exactly how much, however, 
is an open question. 
The contours of parental rights in the context of public schools 
are ambiguous. The Supreme Court has long held that parents have a 
fundamental right to control the upbringing of their children.4 This 
right, often referred to as the Meyer-Pierce right,5 is rooted in the 
substantive due process protections afforded by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.6 In light of Supreme Court jurisprudence, some 
parameters of parental rights are clear: the state cannot force parents 
to enroll their children in public school,7 and parents cannot 
legitimately dispute reasonable regulations or curriculum 
requirements.8 But uncertainty abounds in the legal terrain between 
these extremes. The Supreme Court has not addressed what happens 
when parents wish to exempt their child from certain public school 
 
 3. E.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 
(2000) (plurality opinion) (summarizing the Supreme Court’s parental rights jurisprudence and 
concluding, “[i]n light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to 
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children”). 
 4. See supra note 3. 
 5. E.g., Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir. 2005). Because it was 
articulated in its earliest forms in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), this Note will use the terms “Meyer-Pierce right,” “Meyer-Pierce 
doctrine,” and “parental rights” to refer to parents’ fundamental right to control the upbringing 
of their children. 
 6. E.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66 (plurality opinion) (“[I]t cannot now be doubted that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to 
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”). Substantive due 
process rests on the notion that some rights are so fundamental to the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
concept of liberty that they are “to a great extent . . . immune from federal or state regulation or 
proscription.” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled on other grounds by 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 7. E.g., Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. 
 8. See, e.g., id. at 534 (“No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably 
to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to 
require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral 
character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must 
be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.”). 
BROWN IN FINAL FINAL.DOCFINAL FINAL 9/15/2009  8:09:57 PM 
2009] PARENTAL OBJECTIONS TO SEX EDUCATION 111 
programs or when, if ever, public schools transgress their legitimate 
authority as educators and usurp the parental role. 
Perhaps the tensions between parents and state educators are 
best illustrated by the Sixth Circuit case, Mozert v. Hawkins County 
Board of Education.9 Christian fundamentalist parents brought the 
suit, alleging that the series assigned for a “critical reading” course 
violated their right to control their children’s moral and religious 
upbringing.10 The court rejected the parents’ claim, holding that the 
program did not amount to a violation because it did not compel 
students to affirm or deny any antithetical beliefs11 and because public 
schools need not tailor their curricula to accommodate specific 
parental preferences.12 
Although the Sixth Circuit’s opinion would suggest that the 
school’s victory was relatively straightforward,13 the claim was in fact 
much more complex.14 Professor Nomi Maya Stolzenberg articulates 
the unique problem posed by the dispute: 
Because the plaintiffs did not represent themselves as insular 
outsiders seeking to inhabit a perfectly separated sphere, their right 
to exit the public school system completely did not respond to their 
complaint. Conversely, because they did not seek to reshape or 
convert the public sphere, the school authorities could not readily 
dismiss their claim as an interference with the right of other students 
to be free from religious impositions. The Mozert plaintiffs were 
neither outsiders nor insiders. They sought to be both—and this 
 
 9. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 10. The plaintiffs’ parental rights claim was premised on their assertion that the reading 
series was antithetical to their religious beliefs. Id. at 1060–61; see also Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, 
“He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out”: Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal 
Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581, 595–97 (1993) (listing twenty-eight violations alleged by the 
plaintiffs). 
 11. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1070. 
 12. Id. at 1064. 
 13. Id. at 1074 (Boggs, J., concurring) (“Under the court’s assessment of the facts, this is a 
most uninteresting case. . . . The court reviews the record and finds that the plaintiffs actually 
want a school system that affirmatively teaches the correctness of their religion, and prevents 
other students from mentioning contrary ideas. If that is indeed the case, then it can be very 
easily resolved. It would obviously violate the Establishment Clause for any school system to 
agree with such an extravagant view.”). 
 14. See Stolzenberg, supra note 10, at 591 (“Although the Mozert plaintiffs identified 
particular offensive ‘teachings,’ . . . their quarrel with the assigned series of textbooks was 
broader than that. They explicitly objected to the school’s presentation of differing values and 
beliefs. . . . In other words, the plaintiffs objected to the very principles—tolerance and 
evenhandedness—traditionally used to justify liberal education.”). 
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posture made their resistance to exposure to diversity particularly 
difficult to understand.15 
In essence, then, the question is what happens when parents seek 
to be both insiders and outsiders. If a goal of public education is 
exposure to diverse views,16 then ushering those with minority 
viewpoints to the exit is counterproductive. To what extent can a 
purportedly liberal education system refuse to accommodate minority 
views without betraying its liberal label? 
The questions posed by Mozert remain live issues, particularly in 
the context of sex education (“sex-ed”). Although states claim that 
sex-ed fits within the ambit of their educational mission,17 many 
parents are concerned that public schools’ introduction of human 
sexuality to young students usurps their parental right to direct their 
children’s moral and religious upbringing.18 Schools resist granting 
exemptions on the grounds that accommodation impermissibly 
submits public education to parental preferences.19 As in Mozert, the 
parents who bring these suits are both insiders and outsiders: they 
desire public education’s benefits for their children, but not at the 
expense of their parental rights. 
This Note uses sex-ed programs to explore the contours of 
parental rights and constitutional remedies in the context of public 
schools.20 Sex-ed programs provide an especially apt vehicle for this 
 
 15. Id. at 590–91; see also Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060–61 (noting that the parents only brought 
their challenge when the school discontinued an “alternative program” that had enabled the 
plaintiffs’ children to opt out from the critical reading class). 
 16. E.g., Stolzenberg, supra note 10, at 659. 
 17. Twenty-one states require public schools to educate their students about sexuality, 
disease prevention, or reproduction, and ten states permit (but do not require) such instruction. 
David Rigsby, Sex Education in Schools, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 895, 895–96 (2006). 
 18. Parents undisputedly have the sole legal right to provide for children’s spiritual and 
religious development. Establishment Clause jurisprudence forbids public schools from 
contributing to the religious upbringing of children, even at parents’ behest or approval. See, 
e.g., Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (holding that a public school’s 
approval of voluntary religious instruction during the school day violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments). 
 19. See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 534 (1st Cir. 1995) (“If 
all parents had a fundamental constitutional right to dictate individually what schools teach 
their children, the schools would be forced to cater to a curriculum for each student whose 
parents had genuine moral disagreements with the school’s choice of subject matter.”). 
 20. It is undisputed that parents have the right to enroll their child in a private educational 
curriculum. E.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). When parents are able and 
willing to make that choice, they presumably retain a maximum control over their child’s 
religious and moral upbringing. The more interesting question, however, and the focus of this 
Note, is the extent of parents’ rights within public schools. 
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discussion because they often implicate deeply held beliefs,21 they 
incite political controversy,22 and they are arguably at the margins of 
schools’ core educational functions.23 Supreme Court jurisprudence 
leaves the extent of parents’ constitutional rights in this context 
uncertain, and legal scholarship has given little attention to the 
question of constitutional remedies within public schools.24 This Note 
argues that parents are constitutionally entitled to exempt their 
children from objectionable sex-ed programs and activities. Part I 
discusses the legal posture of parental rights by highlighting relevant 
Supreme Court case law and then analyzing several circuit court 
decisions that involve parental challenges to sex-ed programs. Part II 
demonstrates that sex-ed falls within the scope of parents’ 
fundamental rights and that parental rights merit strict scrutiny 
judicial review. Part III develops and defends a bright-line rule that 
parents are constitutionally entitled to exempt their children from 
discrete objectionable activities or programs. Part IV discusses the 
limitations of judicial remedies in situations in which parents’ 
objections are “not neatly tied to considerations of curriculum or 
educational environment.”25 
 
 21. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 22. E.g., Megan Boldt, Lawmakers Let Sex Ed Debate Rage, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, 
June 11, 2007, at A1; Erin Richards, Milwaukee Area School Districts Grapple with Sex-Ed 
Policies: Districts Shy Away, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 6, 2008, at B1, available at 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/education/29428549.html. 
 23. See infra Part III.C. 
 24. A number of law review articles have commented on the tensions between parental 
rights and liberal education. E.g., Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist 
Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 937–1034 (1996); Stolzenberg, supra note 10, at 589–667; Tyll 
van Geel, Citizenship Education and the Exercise of Religion, 34 AKRON L. REV. 293, 372–81 
(2000). Scholarship regarding a constitutional entitlement to exemptions is, however, more 
limited and does not specifically address the problems posed by parents’ objections to sex-ed or 
other discrete aspects of public education. See, e.g., Keith Brough, Note, Sex Education Left at 
the Threshold of the School Door: Stricter Requirements for Parental Opt-Out Provisions, 46 
FAM. CT. REV. 409, at 412–13 (2008) (arguing that opt-out provisions are not constitutionally 
necessary); Elliott M. Davis, Recent Case, Unjustly Usurping the Parental Right: Fields v. 
Palmdale School District, 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005), 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1133, 
1143–44 (2006) (lamenting courts’ failure to adequately protect parental rights); Heather M. 
Good, Comment, “The Forgotten Child of Our Constitution”: The Parental Free Exercise Right 
to Direct the Education and Religious Upbringing of Children, 54 EMORY L.J. 641, 641–79 (2005) 
(arguing for a more robust hybrid rights doctrine); Michael E. Lechliter, Note, The Free 
Exercise of Religion and Public Schools: The Implications of Hybrid Rights on the Religious 
Upbringing of Children, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2209, 2237–41 (2005) (arguing in favor of a more 
robust hybrid rights analysis to protect parental rights). 
 25. C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 183 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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I.  THE LEGAL POSTURE OF PARENTAL RIGHTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
When parents enroll their children in public school, they 
surrender a substantial degree of control over how and what their 
children are taught.26 In the midst of a dearth of Supreme Court 
guidance regarding the scope of parental rights, the question is 
whether parental rights retain vitality once children cross the 
schoolhouse door. This Part discusses the current legal climate 
regarding parental rights and sex-ed. Section A presents the Supreme 
Court decisions that form the legal foundation for parental rights. 
Section B then illustrates the uncertainty and disagreement among 
federal circuit courts regarding the scope of parents’ rights, 
particularly with respect to sex-ed programs in public schools. 
A.  Parental Rights and the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has said that “[i]t is cardinal . . . that the 
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, 
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for 
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”27 There is 
consequently a “private realm of family life which the state cannot 
enter.”28 
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,29 the Supreme Court invalidated a 
law requiring children to attend public school.30 The law 
impermissibly restricted parents’ substantive due process rights, 
which, the Court declared, included the choice to enroll their children 
in private schools.31 The Pierce decision came on the heels of an 
earlier parental rights decision, Meyer v. Nebraska,32 in which the 
Court struck down a law prohibiting schools from teaching any 
foreign language prior to eighth grade because it interfered with 
 
 26. For instance, parents generally cannot challenge a school’s academic calendar, 
graduation requirements, or curriculum decisions (such as teaching the multiplication table in 
the second grade). E.g., Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 102 (1st Cir. 2008); C.N., 430 F.3d at 182; 
Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir. 2005); Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. 
Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2005); Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 
2003); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 291 (5th Cir. 2001); Swanson v. 
Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 702 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 27. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 30. Id. at 534–35. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
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parents’ substantive due process right to educate their children.33 
Elaborating on Meyer, the Pierce Court held that, “The child is not 
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his 
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and 
prepare him for additional obligations.”34 These additional obligations 
“include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and 
elements of good citizenship.”35 The Pierce language suggests that 
these realms may be the exclusive province of parents; however, the 
Court also affirmed the state’s power to require that “certain studies 
plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught.”36 Thus, both 
parents and the state are charged with equipping children for the 
elements of good citizenship, but parents appear to have a 
constitutional monopoly over children’s moral and spiritual 
development.37 
A final iconic Supreme Court decision respecting parental rights 
is Wisconsin v. Yoder.38 In Yoder, the Court exempted Amish parents 
from compulsory schooling laws.39 Yoder is therefore broader than 
Meyer and Pierce because the Amish parents sought to excuse their 
children from formal schooling requirements altogether.40 In granting 
the exemption, the Court relied on both free exercise and substantive 
due process grounds.41 Yoder thus stands as a significant building 
block for parents’ constitutional right to direct their children’s 
education and to control their children’s moral and religious 
upbringing. 
 
 33. Id. at 400–01. 
 34. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. 
 35. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). 
 36. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534. 
 37. States clearly cannot contribute to children’s spiritual upbringing, for that would run 
afoul of the Establishment Clause. E.g., Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 
209–11 (1948); see also, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (holding that a school 
graduation prayer violated the Establishment Clause). Given the connection between morality 
and religion, states at least must tread lightly and carefully when directing children’s moral 
upbringing. 
 38. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 39. Id. at 234. 
 40. Id. at 209 (“[A]ttendance at high school, public or private, was contrary to the Amish 
religion and way of life.”). 
 41. Id. at 233 (“[W]hen the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim 
of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely ‘a reasonable relation to some purpose 
within the competency of the State’ is required to sustain the validity of the State’s requirement 
under the First Amendment.”). 
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In its most recent decision regarding parental rights, Troxel v. 
Granville,42 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that parents’ right to direct 
their children’s upbringing “is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental 
liberty interests recognized by [the] Court.”43 In Troxel, the Court 
struck down a law permitting any person to petition for visitation 
rights at any time as violating parents’ substantive due process right 
to direct the “care, custody, and control of their children.”44 Unlike 
the statutes at issue in its predecessor cases, which involved flat 
prohibitions, the statute in Troxel did not take the children away from 
their mother, but instead limited her decisions regarding their child 
custody, care, and control by prescribing a particular visitation time 
with particular people.45 Troxel can therefore be read as establishing 
that parental rights are implicated not only when the state flatly 
prohibits certain conduct, but also when the state obstructs parental 
decisionmaking.46 
B.  Disagreement among the Circuits about the Proper Role of 
Parental Rights with Respect to Sex-Ed 
Although Supreme Court precedent clearly establishes parents’ 
right to control the moral and religious upbringing of their children, 
federal circuit courts disagree as to whether the Meyer-Pierce right 
retains any vitality once children cross the public schoolhouse door. 
This Section examines several federal circuit court decisions that 
illustrate the nebulous nature of parental rights in the context of 
public schools’ sex-ed programs. Whereas the First and Ninth Circuits 
construe parental rights very narrowly, the Third Circuit offers an 
expansive view. 
1. “Keep Out”: Parents’ Rights Stop at the School’s Door.  The 
First and Ninth Circuits have adopted a limited view of parental 
 
 42. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 43. Id. at 65. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 72; see also Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 306 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that 
parental rights are implicated not only in the face of proscriptions but also when the state limits 
parents’ options). 
 46. Several lower federal courts, however, have read Meyer and Pierce as merely a 
constitutional limitation on situations involving flat prohibitions on parental conduct. E.g., 
Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2005); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & 
Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533–34 (1st Cir. 1995); see also infra Part I.B.1. 
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rights, holding that the Meyer-Pierce right is satisfied when parents 
choose whether or not to enroll their children in public school. 
In Fields v. Palmdale School District,47 parents of elementary 
school children alleged that the administration of a psychological 
harms survey to their children violated their parental rights.48 Among 
other things, the survey asked the children how often they think 
about having sex, touch their own “private parts,” and think about 
touching “other people’s private parts.”49 Although the school sought 
and obtained parental permission before administering the survey, it 
neither conveyed the sexual nature of the survey nor offered parents 
an opportunity to review it before consenting to their child’s 
participation.50 The parents claimed that had they known about the 
survey’s sexual nature, they would not have allowed their children to 
participate.51 
In rejecting the parents’ claim, the Ninth Circuit expanded the 
parameters of school authority at the expense of parental rights. The 
court held that although parents have a “right to inform their children 
when and as they wish on the subject of sex,” they cannot “prevent a 
public school from providing its students with whatever information it 
wishes to provide, sexual or otherwise, when and as the school 
determines that it is appropriate to do so.”52 Parents and schools 
therefore have equal authority to discuss sexual matters with children. 
Noting the logistical and administrative difficulties of accommodating 
parents’ moral and religious preferences,53 the court seemed chiefly 
motivated by a broad understanding of school authority. Because 
“education is not merely about teaching the basics of reading, writing, 
and arithmetic”54 but also includes fostering children’s mental health,55 
 
 47. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 48. Id. at 1203. The survey was administered to students in the first, third, and fifth grades. 
Id. at 1201. 
 49. Id. at 1202. The sexual references included the following statements, among others: 
“Touching my private parts too much;” “Thinking about having sex;” “Having sex feelings in 
my body;” and “Can’t stop thinking about sex.” Id. at 1202 n.3 (presenting the comprehensive 
list of references that gave rise to the lawsuit). 
 50. See id. at 1201 & n.1 (reproducing the language of the permission letter); id. at 1202 & 
n.3 (reproducing the survey questions that contained references to sex). 
 51. Id. at 1202. 
 52. Id. at 1206. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1209. 
 55. Id. 
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the court found that the survey fell within the school’s educational 
mission.56 
In its narrowest sense, Fields means that parents and schools 
have equal authority to introduce children to sexual matters. More 
broadly, however, Fields stands for the proposition that parents, once 
they enroll their children in public school, have exercised the full 
extent of their constitutional rights.57 They relinquish their exclusive 
right to direct their child’s upbringing and instead share that authority 
with the state. If matters of mental health and sexuality are 
appropriately within the state’s purview, then parents acquiesce to the 
state teaching their children about such matters.58 Consistent with this 
reasoning, the Ninth Circuit rejected the parents’ claim. The court 
explained that when they chose to enroll their children in the 
Palmdale School District, they also “chose” each decision that the 
school would make regarding their child’s education, including its 
decision to administer the challenged sex survey.59 The parents 
therefore had no constitutional complaint.60 
Although the parents in Fields did not allege a free exercise 
claim, it is unlikely that they would have fared any better if they had. 
In a decision on which Fields relies heavily,61 the First Circuit rejected 
 
 56. Id. at 1211. 
 57. See id. at 1206 (“[O]nce parents make the choice as to which school their children will 
attend, their fundamental right to control the education of their children is, at the least, 
substantially diminished.”). The court’s original opinion states that “the Meyer-Pierce right does 
not extend beyond the threshold of the school door.” Id. at 1207. The Ninth Circuit affirmed its 
holding en banc but amended the opinion to delete that line. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 447 
F.3d 1187, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). That modification, however, seems more an effort 
to placate public outcry, e.g., Andrew Trotter, House Criticizes Court’s School Sex-Survey 
Ruling, EDUC. WEEK, Nov. 30, 2005, at 28, than a substantive alteration. The Ninth Circuit still 
affirmed the rest of its Fields opinion, Fields, 447 F.3d at 1190, which strongly suggests that the 
Meyer-Pierce right is vindicated when parents enroll their children in public school, see Fields, 
427 F.3d at 1206–07 (noting the limits on judicial scrutiny once parents have chosen to send their 
children to public school and “affirm[ing] that the Meyer-Pierce right does not extend beyond 
the threshold of the [public] school door”). 
 58. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1207 (“[W]hat Meyer-Pierce establishes is the right of parents to 
be free from state interference with their choice of the educational forum itself, a choice that 
ordinarily determines the type of education one’s child will receive. The School District’s design 
and administration of the survey in no way interfered with that right.”). 
 59. Id. (“Indeed, it was only because the parents had selected the school they did that their 
children were asked the questions to which the parents objected.”). 
 60. See id. at 1211 (“[P]arents are possessed of no constitutional right to prevent the public 
schools from providing information on [matters of and relating to sex] to their students in any 
forum or manner they select.”). 
 61. Id. at 1205. 
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a “hybrid”62 parental–free exercise claim. In Brown v. Hot, Sexy and 
Safer Productions,63 parents challenged a public high school’s 
assembly on AIDS awareness.64 The mandatory, ninety-minute 
assembly consisted of “sexually explicit monologues” and “sexually 
suggestive skits” in which students chosen from the audience 
participated.65 After “[telling] the students that they were going to 
have a ‘group sexual experience, with audience participation,’” the 
instructor gave a sexually explicit presentation, using profanity, 
advocating various forms of sexual behavior, and making sexual 
comments about students.66 Although the school had a policy of 
obtaining parental permission for any “instruction in human 
sexuality,” it did not notify parents about the assembly or give them 
an opportunity to excuse their children.67 The parents sued the school 
district, alleging, among other claims, that the assembly violated their 
free exercise rights and their right to direct and control the 
upbringing of their children.68 
The court rejected the parents’ claim, holding that the Meyer-
Pierce right is limited to parents’ choice of whether or not to send 
 
 62. The notion of hybrid rights comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In holding that neutral laws of general applicability 
trigger rational basis review in the face of free exercise challenges, id. at 879–80, the Court 
distinguished prior cases in which it had applied strict scrutiny: “The only decisions in which we 
have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to 
religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free 
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as . . . the right of 
parents . . . to direct the education of their children.” Id. at 881 (citation omitted). This “hybrid 
rights” doctrine has produced much confusion among the circuits. See, e.g., Lechliter, supra note 
24, at 2222–34 (discussing the three approaches to hybrid rights claims that have been adopted 
by the circuit courts). 
 63. Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 64. Id. at 529. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. (“Specifically, the complaint alleges that Landolphi: 1) told the students that they 
were going to have a ‘group sexual experience, with audience participation’; 2) used profane, 
lewd, and lascivious language to describe body parts and excretory functions; 3) advocated and 
approved oral sex, masturbation, homosexual sexual activity, and condom use during 
promiscuous premarital sex; 4) simulated masturbation; 5) characterized the loose pants worn 
by one minor as ‘erection wear’; 6) referred to being in ‘deep sh–’ after anal sex; 7) had a male 
minor lick an oversized condom with her, after which she had a female minor pull it over the 
male minor’s entire head and blow it up; 8) encouraged a male minor to display his ‘orgasm 
face’ with her for the camera; 9) informed a male minor that he was not having enough orgasms; 
10) closely inspected a minor and told him he had a ‘nice butt’; and 11) made eighteen 
references to orgasms, six references to male genitals, and eight references to female genitals.”). 
 67. Id. at 530. 
 68. Id. 
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their children to public school.69 It grounded its holding in the 
logistical ramifications of a free-sweeping right to dictate public 
school curricula, which the court feared would force schools “to cater 
a curriculum for each student whose parents had genuine moral 
disagreements with the school’s choice of subject matter.”70 
The court also rejected the parents’ free exercise challenge.71 In 
its hybrid rights analysis, the court required that the free exercise 
claim be conjoined with an independently viable constitutional 
claim72—an approach reflecting the most stringent construction of 
hybrid rights.73 The court dismissed the parents’ free exercise claim on 
two grounds: first, because it was not conjoined with an 
independently viable constitutional claim, and second, because the 
parents did not allege that the program “threatened their entire way 
of life.”74 This requirement is somewhat bizarre given that Supreme 
Court precedent does not require that a claimant’s entire way of life 
be threatened to trigger the free exercise clause’s protections.75 
Brown and Fields significantly restrict the scope of parental 
rights. Although it is unremarkable that parents do not have the right 
to dictate public schools’ curricula, those plaintiffs sought 
considerably narrower relief. In each instance, the parents objected to 
a discrete activity or event.76 They did not endeavor to force the 
school to teach their own views; rather, they requested only advance 
 
 69. See id. at 533 (“The Meyer and Pierce cases, we think, evince the principle that the state 
cannot prevent parents from choosing a specific educational program . . . . We do not think, 
however, that this freedom encompasses a fundamental constitutional right to dictate the 
curriculum at the public school to which they have chosen to send their children.”). 
 70. See id. at 534 (rejecting parents’ right to “dictate” the public school curriculum of the 
school their child attends). 
 71. Id. at 539. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Lechliter, supra note 24, at 2222–34 (discussing the three approaches to hybrid 
rights claims that have been adopted among the circuit courts). 
 74. Brown, 68 F.3d at 539. 
 75. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1990) (“It is no more appropriate 
for judges to determine the ‘centrality’ of religious beliefs before applying a ‘compelling 
interest’ test in the free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine the ‘importance’ 
of ideas before applying the ‘compelling interest’ test in the free speech field.”). 
 76. In Brown, the parents objected to a single, ninety-minute assembly. Brown, 68 F.3d at 
529. In Fields, the survey lasted one hour. See Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1201 
n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The assessment will consist of three, twenty-minute self-report measures, 
which will be given to your child on one day during the last week of January.”). 
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notice and an opportunity to exempt their children.77 Like the parents 
in Mozert, they sought to be both insiders and outsiders.78 
2. “Parents Welcome”: Absent a Compelling State Interest, 
Parents’ Decisions Prevail.  Other circuits have rejected the First and 
Ninth Circuits’ view that parental rights do not extend to the public 
school setting.79 Most notably, the Third Circuit has affirmed a robust 
view of parental rights by requiring schools to yield to parental 
authority absent a compelling state interest.80 
In Gruenke v. Seip,81 a high school swimming coach allegedly 
pressured a student to take a pregnancy test after observing that she 
had decreased energy and poor performance at practice.82 The coach 
discussed the results of the test with other members of the school 
community, but not with the student’s parents.83 In holding that the 
school had violated the parents’ right to direct their child’s 
upbringing, the court affirmed that certain spheres—including moral 
and religious education—are the exclusive province of parents. The 
court wrote: 
It is not educators, but parents, who have primary rights in the 
upbringing of children. School officials have only a secondary 
responsibility and must respect these rights. State deference to 
parental control over children is underscored by the Court’s 
 
 77. These requests would impose, at most, a de minimis burden on schools. In Brown, the 
school had a policy of notification and exemption that it failed to follow in the situation giving 
rise to the parents’ claims, Brown, 68 F.3d at 530, so the policy is presumptively not 
burdensome. In Fields, the parents were given inadequate notice. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1201 
(“The letter did not explicitly state that some questions involved sexual topics . . . .”). 
 78. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 79. See, e.g., Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]his 
right [to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children] plainly extends to the public 
school setting . . . .”); Arnold v. Bd. of Educ., 880 F.2d 305, 312–13 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that 
a public school violated parents’ constitutional right to direct their child’s moral and religious 
upbringing when the school prevented a minor couple from consulting with their parents about 
the decision to obtain an abortion); Rhoades v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 574 F. Supp. 
2d 888, 898 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (“This court agrees with C.N. that the approach in Fields would gut 
parental rights on the issue of education of any content other than choosing a school.”); Scheck 
v. Baileyville Sch. Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679, 688 (D. Me. 1982) (“Parents do not surrender their 
right to ‘control the education of their own [children]’ by enrolling them in public school, except 
to the extent that the prescribed curriculum serves legitimate educational purposes.” (alteration 
in original) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923))). 
 80. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 305 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 81. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 82. Id. at 295–96. 
 83. Id. at 297. 
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admonitions that “the child is not the mere creature of the State,” 
and that it is the parents’ responsibility to inculcate “moral 
standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.”84 
According to the Third Circuit, the parental right does not wane 
when parents decide to enroll their children in public school. Public 
school officials do retain legitimate authority to impose standards on 
students’ conduct to “maintain order and a proper educational 
atmosphere.”85 But when there is a conflict, the Third Circuit affords 
deference to parental rights rather than to school policies: 
It is not unforeseeable . . . that a school’s policies might come into 
conflict with the fundamental right of parents to raise and nurture 
their child. But when such collisions occur, the primacy of the 
parents’ authority must be recognized and should yield only where 
the school’s action is tied to a compelling interest.86 
Although Gruenke apparently strengthens parental rights claims, 
its ultimate influence remains to be seen.87 Gruenke presents 
particularly unusual facts that are likely to be easily distinguishable 
from future cases. Coercing a student to take a pregnancy test and 
then widely discussing the results is damaging to a child in a way that 
a mandatory assembly or survey is not.88 Indeed, in its rejection of a 
parental rights challenge to a sex survey, the Third Circuit 
distinguished Gruenke based on its uniquely egregious facts.89 
In C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of Education,90 parents challenged a 
survey given to middle and high school students.91 Although the 
school notified parents of the survey and provided parents an 
opportunity to review its content,92 the parents sued because the 
school administered the survey in a manner that suggested to students 
 
 84. Id. at 307 (citations omitted). 
 85. Id. at 304. 
 86. Id. at 305. 
 87. See generally Robert Kubica, Issues in the Third Circuit, Let’s Talk About Sex: School 
Surveys and Parents’ Fundamental Right to Make Decisions Concerning the Upbringing of Their 
Children, 51 VILL. L. REV. 1085, 1104 (2006) (arguing that the Third Circuit typically favors 
schools in parental rights cases). 
 88. This is true if only because a child is especially vulnerable when facing an unexpected 
pregnancy. 
 89. C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 185 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 90. C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 91. Id. at 161. 
 92. Id. at 164. 
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that it was mandatory.93 The court rejected the parents’ claim, finding 
that it fell short of the constitutional violation in Gruenke.94 Given 
that the survey was voluntary and parents were notified, this holding 
is unsurprising. The C.N. court did, however, reiterate that parents 
occupy a unique sphere of authority into which schools cannot 
encroach95 and explicitly rejected the narrow view of parental rights 
adopted by the First and Ninth Circuits.96 Because the court found no 
constitutional violation in C.N.,97 the real bite of Gruenke remains to 
be seen. 
Nevertheless, Gruenke likely has implications beyond its unique 
facts. The court relied heavily on the finding that the coach’s actions 
actually prevented the parents from dealing with their daughter’s 
pregnancy discreetly.98 When schools introduce young children to 
sexual matters or advocate sexual behaviors, they preempt parents’ 
decisions about when children should be introduced to those topics 
(thereby limiting parents’ options for how to deal with matters 
pertaining to sex).99 Moreover, the First or Ninth Circuits likely would 
have decided Gruenke differently: under the rationale in Fields, a 
school’s educational mission includes facilitating students’ health, and 
providing pregnancy tests is reasonably related to that goal.100 
 
 93. Although the survey was designed to be voluntary, id., there was a considerable degree 
of ambiguity as to whether the survey was presented to students as a voluntary activity, id. at 
175–76. 
 94. Id. at 185. 
 95. See id. at 185 n.26 (“[I]t is primarily the parents’ right to ‘inculcate moral standards, 
religious beliefs and elements of good citizenship.’” (quoting Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 307 
(3d Cir. 2000))). 
 96. Id. (“In reaching this conclusion, we do not hold, as did the panel in Fields v. Palmdale 
School District, that the right of parents under the Meyer-Pierce rubric ‘does not extend beyond 
the threshold of the school door.’” (quoting Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1207 
(9th Cir. 2005))). Because the court in Fields so heavily relied on Brown, Fields v. Palmdale Sch. 
Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1205 (9th Cir. 2005), the C.N. court’s explicit rejection of Fields is 
tantamount to a rejection of Brown as well. 
 97. C.N., 430 F.3d at 185. 
 98. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 306 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 99. See C.N., 430 F.3d at 185 (“We recognize that introducing a child to sensitive topics 
before a parent might have done so herself can complicate and even undermine parental 
authority . . . .”); Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 307 (“School-sponsored counseling and psychological 
testing that pry into private family activities can overstep the boundaries of school authority and 
impermissibly usurp the fundamental rights of parents to bring up their children . . . .”); see also 
Tara Dahl, Surveys in America’s Classrooms: How Much Do Parents Really Know?, 37 J.L. & 
EDUC. 143, 190 (2008) (suggesting that the plaintiff parents in Fields could have prevailed on 
their claim under the rationale in Gruenke). 
 100. Particularly when, as in Gruenke, the coach’s action was motivated by concern over the 
swimmer’s performance, Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 295–96, the pregnancy test can be considered 
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Unlike the constricted view of rights in the First and Ninth 
Circuits, the Third Circuit recognizes that parental rights extend 
beyond the decision to enroll children in public school. The essential 
conflict that these cases reveal is whether or not there is a province 
that uniquely belongs to parents, allowing them to tell a public school 
to “keep out.” 
II.  PARENTS’ FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND SEX-ED 
The Supreme Court has recognized that although public 
education rests largely in the hands of state and local authorities, 
courts may appropriately step in when constitutional rights are 
implicated.101 The scope of parents’ right to direct their children’s 
education and to control their moral and religious upbringing is 
crucial to understanding the merits of constitutional challenges to sex-
ed programs. This Part argues that parents’ fundamental right to 
direct their children’s moral and educational upbringing includes the 
right to decide when and how to introduce them to topics of sexuality. 
When parents allege that this right has been violated, their claim 
should trigger strict scrutiny review. 
A.  The Parental Right Encompasses Sex-Ed 
Because views of sexuality are often inextricably linked to one’s 
moral or religious beliefs,102 parents’ fundamental right to direct their 
 
reasonably related to the school’s educational mission. There may, however, be a meaningful 
distinction between situations like those in Brown and Fields, which involve a generally 
applicable program that incidentally infringes on parental rights, and situations like that in 
Gruenke, which involve specific, targeted treatment of an individual student. Cf. Arcara v. 
Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 704–05 (1986) (holding that a generally applicable public health 
regulation does not implicate the First Amendment when its effects on speech are merely 
incidental). But see infra Part II.B. 
 101. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“By and large, public education in 
our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot 
intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and 
which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values.”). When constitutional 
rights are implicated, courts have been willing to step in and dictate certain aspects of public 
schools’ curricula. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871–72 (1982) (holding that 
school boards cannot remove books from the school library based on disagreement with the 
ideas they contain); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 109 (holding unconstitutional a prohibition against 
teaching evolution in public schools). 
 102. E.g., Naomi Rivkind Shatz, Note, Unconstitutional Entanglements: The Religious Right, 
the Federal Government, and Abstinence Education in the Schools, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
495, 524–30 (2008). 
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children’s upbringing should encompass their right to direct their 
children’s exposure to sexual topics. 
In Fields and Brown, the courts rejected the parents’ claims as 
beyond the scope of Fourteenth Amendment rights.103 By confining 
Supreme Court precedent to situations involving flat prohibitions on 
parental conduct,104 the courts distinguished the claims at issue in 
Fields and Brown because parents were not altogether prevented from 
talking to their children about sex.105 The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Troxel, discussed in Part I.A, undermines this narrow construction of 
parental rights.106 Although sex-ed does not affirmatively prohibit 
parental teaching about sex, it does “obstruct”107 the parental right to 
decide how and when to discuss sexual issues. Sexual behavior and 
sexuality are controversial topics, and religious beliefs often shape 
individual views in these areas.108 A school’s unrestricted ability to 
introduce children to the topic of sex without parental notification or 
consent effectively preempts and usurps a parent’s discretion as to 
when and how to discuss sex.109 
Many courts and commentators doubt that a school’s authority 
to teach children about sex without parental notice or consent 
unconstitutionally burdens parental rights.110 After all, children are 
exposed to sexual matters through a multitude of sources, including 
classmates, television, advertising, and music.111 Given these realities, 
 
 103. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1205 (9th Cir. 2005); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & 
Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525, 534 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 104. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1205; Brown, 68 F.3d at 533–34. 
 105. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1206 (“Parents have a right to inform their children when and as 
they wish on the subject of sex . . . .”); Brown, 68 F.3d at 534 (noting that the parents’ claim was 
not based on any flat prohibition). 
 106. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text. 
 107. Cf. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 306 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing the allegation that a 
school counselor’s conduct, which led to negative publicity, obstructed the plaintiff parent’s 
right to address her daughter’s pregnancy). 
 108. E.g., Shatz, supra note 102, at 524–30. 
 109. Especially in the elementary school context, parents may decide not to introduce the 
topic of sex until their children are older. If a school has a unilateral right to teach children 
about sex, however, then it can preempt parents’ decisions about when to initiate any 
discussions about sexuality. 
 110. E.g., C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 185 (3rd Cir. 2005); Brough, supra 
note 24, at 413. 
 111. E.g., C.N., 430 F.3d at 185 (“[A] myriad of influences surround middle and high school 
students everyday, many of which are beyond the strict control of the parent or even abhorrent 
to the parent.”); Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 841–
46 (2007). See generally DIANE E. LEVIN & JEAN KILBURNE, SO SEXY SO SOON: THE NEW 
SEXUALIZED CHILDHOOD AND WHAT PARENTS CAN DO TO PROTECT THEIR KIDS (2008) 
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a school’s contributions to otherwise widely accessible sexual 
information may have little marginal effect on parental rights. 
There are two flaws in this argument. First, there is a distinction 
between the incidental, endemic difficulties of childrearing and an 
affirmative state power to interfere. No other realm of civil rights 
acquiesces to government violations simply because “everyone else is 
doing it.” The fact that people in society may espouse racist views, for 
instance, does not render the state’s espousal of racism insignificant. 
Second, because a public school’s instruction on sexuality carries the 
imprimatur of the state, it is uniquely authoritative—at least more so 
than the general cultural milieu.112 The Supreme Court has 
consistently accounted for the impressionability of young children in 
the Establishment Clause context,113 and it would be inconsistent to 
deny that impressionability when it comes to sex-ed. 
A related argument is that public schools routinely limit parents’ 
right to control their children through various administrative 
requirements, such as the hours in a school day, curriculum decisions, 
and school dress code policies.114 These types of restrictions are 
routinely upheld;115 indeed, without them, schools’ educational role 
would be handicapped by insurmountable administrative burdens.116 
In Fields, the Ninth Circuit viewed the challenged survey as 
analogous to these types of school requirements and thus found 
parental objections similarly meritless.117 
One must pause, however, and consider whether all parental 
rights claims are equal, especially in terms of the nature of the alleged 
violation. In Blau v. Fort Thomas Public School District,118 the Sixth 
 
(demonstrating that children are being sexualized at increasingly young ages and lamenting the 
adverse consequences). 
 112. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“In the marketplace of ideas, the government has vast resources and special 
status.”). 
 113. E.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S 577, 592 (1992). 
 114. E.g., Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1204–05 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 115. E.g., Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2005) (mandatory 
dress code); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 291 (5th Cir. 2001) (mandatory 
uniform policy); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-L, 135 F.3d 694, 696 (10th Cir. 
1998) (mandatory full-time attendance policy); Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of 
Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 176 (4th Cir. 1996) (mandatory community service requirements). 
 116. For a discussion of the argument that parental rights can sometimes appropriately 
handicap the educational role of schools, see infra Part III.C. 
 117. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1207 (relying in part on Blau to conclude that a parent’s Meyer-
Pierce rights do not extend beyond the choice to enroll one’s child in public school). 
 118. Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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Circuit upheld a public high school’s dress code against a parental 
rights claim.119 The parents’ claim in this case was essentially that they 
had a fundamental right to let their child wear whatever she wanted.120 
This asserted right is an attenuated leap from well-established 
parental rights, namely the right to direct the upbringing of one’s 
children.121 Perhaps the Fields court overlooked a meaningful 
difference between a fashion faux pas and conscientious objections. 
One commentator raised exactly this point: 
Implicitly, the [Fields] court equates an alleged right to exempt a 
child from a dress code with an alleged right to prevent seven-year-
olds from taking a sexually laden survey. Though blue jeans might 
be stylish and comfortable, the parental interest in a child’s ability to 
wear them does not offer a “flattering analogy” to the much more 
compelling interest in shielding a child from sexual content.122 
In contrast to challenges to public school administrative 
guidelines, a parent’s role in guiding a child’s decisions is stronger 
when moral and religious precepts are at stake. Society wants parents 
to fulfill their role as moral tutors.123 Moreover, the consequences of 
granting an exemption are entirely different in the dress code context, 
when an exemption would foil the policy’s very purpose—
uniformity—and impair its benefits.124 In contrast, exempting one 
 
 119. Id. at 395–96. 
 120. See id. at 389–90 (“[T]he Blaus have not met their burden of showing that the First 
Amendment protects [their child’s] conduct—which in this instance amounts to nothing more 
than a generalized and vague desire to express her middle-school individuality. . . . [T]he First 
Amendment does not protect such vague and attenuated notions of expression—namely, self-
expression through any and all clothing that a 12-year old may wish to wear on a given day.”). 
 121. See id. at 393–94 (“The list of fundamental rights . . . does not include the wearing of 
dungarees . . . . Nor do the fundamental rights that the Court has recognized offer a flattering 
analogy to [the] claim [to wear blue jeans]. Whether it be the right to marry, the right to have 
children, the right to direct the educational upbringing of one’s child, the right to marital privacy, 
the right to use contraception, the right to bodily integrity, or the right to abortion, none of 
these fundamental rights has much, if anything, in common with the right to wear blue jeans.” 
(citations omitted) (second emphasis added)); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 
275, 289 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The fundamental right of filiation and companionship with one’s 
children, which the Supreme Court examined in Troxel, is an entirely different balance of 
interests from the right of parents to send their children to a public school in clothes of their 
own choosing.” (quoting Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 108 F. Supp. 2d 681, 702 (N.D. 
Tex. 2000))). 
 122. Davis, supra note 24, at 1140. 
 123. See infra notes 142–46 and accompanying text. 
 124. The purposes of a dress code are to create unity, strengthen school spirit, minimize 
distractions, enhance safety, promote good behavior, reduce discipline problems, and bridge 
socioeconomic gaps. E.g., Blau, 401 F.3d at 385. Allowing even one student to deviate from the 
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student from a sex-ed program does not undermine the school’s 
purpose with respect to the other students.125 
There is thus a strong argument that parents’ constitutional right 
to direct their children’s upbringing includes the right to decide when 
and how their children will learn about sexual matters. A school’s 
decision to teach children about sex burdens that right. 
B.  Parental Rights Claims Merit Strict Scrutiny 
The Supreme Court explicitly has christened as “fundamental” 
parents’ rights to direct the education and religious and moral 
upbringing of their children.126 Fundamental rights typically trigger 
strict scrutiny review,127 yet the Supreme Court has never been clear 
about the level of scrutiny it applies to parental rights. In its earliest 
parental rights cases, the Court apparently applied rational basis 
review.128 But in Troxel, the Court implies that parental rights to 
control their children’s upbringing trigger some level of heightened 
 
dress code would at least undermine the school’s goals of minimizing distractions and bridging 
socioeconomic problems. But see Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 293 (describing a school district’s 
provision allowing parents to opt their children out of the uniform requirement if they had a 
bona fide religious or philosophical objection). 
 125. See infra Part III.C. But see Parker v. Hurley, 474 F. Supp. 2d 261, 265 (D. Mass. 2007), 
aff’d, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (“An exodus from class when issues of homosexuality or same-
sex marriage are to be discussed could send the message that gays, lesbians, and the children of 
same-sex parents are inferior and, therefore, have a damaging effect on those students. It might 
also undermine the [school officials’] efforts to educate the remaining other students to 
understand and respect differences in sexual orientation.” (citation omitted)); Yuval Simchi-
Levi, Note, Amending the Massachusetts Parental Notification Statute, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & 
GENDER 759, 776–79 (2008) (presenting social science data demonstrating the detrimental 
effects of intolerance on gay, lesbian, and transgender youth and arguing that education on 
sexual diversity in public schools benefits sexual minorities). 
 126. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“In a long line of cases, 
we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the 
‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right[] . . . to direct the education and 
upbringing of one’s children.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (labeling “the 
traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children” as 
“fundamental”); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t 
cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the 
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of 
their children.”). 
 127. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. 
 128. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (“[T]he statute as applied is arbitrary 
and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State.”). Under 
rational basis review, a statute need only bear “a reasonable relation to a legitimate state 
interest.” E.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722. 
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scrutiny.129 Although the circuits are divided on the issue,130 the 
traditional application of strict scrutiny protection, coupled with 
Troxel, strongly supports strict scrutiny—or at the very least, 
heightened review—of infringements of parental rights.131 
Parents’ rights in the context of public school sex-ed fall within 
the rationale behind strict scrutiny protection. Courts typically apply 
strict scrutiny in two instances: when fundamental rights are at stake, 
or when there is a special concern that certain minorities are 
vulnerable to government oppression.132 In both instances, strict 
scrutiny protects citizens by “plac[ing] the matter outside the arena of 
public debate and legislative action.”133 But because the Court is 
hesitant to extend the parameters of heightened constitutional 
protection,134 it has outlined additional considerations for applying 
strict scrutiny. The Court primarily looks to whether the fundamental 
 
 129. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (plurality opinion) (explaining “heightened protection [for] 
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests” and then labeling the parental interest in the 
care, custody, and control of children as a “fundamental liberty interest[]”); id. at 80 (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (“The opinions of the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter recognize 
[parents’ constitutional right to determine who will educate and socialize their children], but 
curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of review. I would apply strict 
scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights.”); Good, supra note 24, at 658–59 (“[G]iven the 
plurality opinion, coupled with Justice Thomas’s concurrence [applying strict scrutiny]—at least 
five of the Justices favor at least intermediate scrutiny when a fundamental parental right is at 
issue.”). 
 130. Compare Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 305 (3d Cir. 2000) (requiring the school’s 
infringing action to be “tied to a compelling interest”), with Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 
68 F.3d 525, 533 n.5 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[T]he [Meyer and Pierce] opinions indicate that something 
less than the current ‘compelling state interest’ test was then used to evaluate a substantive due 
process challenge involving one of the listed liberty interests . . . .”). Although Brown was 
decided before Troxel, the First Circuit’s analysis in subsequent cases suggests that it does not 
read Troxel to require strict scrutiny review of parental rights claims. See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 
514 F.3d 87, 101 (1st Cir. 2008) (“The Troxel plurality did not . . . specifically address which 
standard of review to apply when this due process right is implicated.”). 
 131. See Good, supra note 24, at 660 (“The question is not whether a heightened standard of 
review should apply but which heightened form applies: intermediate or strict scrutiny. 
Presumably strict scrutiny should apply, but at the very least, intermediate scrutiny should be 
used.”). 
 132. E.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719–22; JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: 
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73–104 (1980); see also United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 
U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of [] political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching 
judicial inquiry.”); LUCAS A. POWE JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 488 
(2000) (“Footnote Four was designed in part to protect religious dissenters, not mainstream 
religions.”). 
 133. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. 
 134. E.g., id. 
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right is (1) “deeply rooted in [the] Nation’s history and tradition”135 
and (2) “‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ such that ‘neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.’”136 
Parents’ right to direct their children’s education and moral 
training satisfies these two criteria.137 There is a long tradition 
supporting parental rights and the duty of parents to care for their 
children. Blackstone described the parent-child relationship as one of 
the “most universal . . . in nature.”138 Of all parental duties, 
Blackstone believed that the duty to educate one’s children was 
uniquely important.139 Indeed, it is the only duty that he thought the 
state should proactively encourage parents to fulfill.140 After tracing 
the development of parental rights over two thousand years, 
Professor Eric A. DeGroff concludes that “to suggest these values are 
‘deeply rooted in [the] Nation’s history and tradition,’ are ‘basic 
values that underlie our society,’ and reflect legal rights that have 
been ‘traditionally protected by our society’ would be, if anything, an 
understatement.”141 
Parents’ right to control their children’s moral and educational 
upbringing also satisfies the Court’s second requirement. Parental 
care is indispensable to the health of a liberal democracy.142 Professor 
DeGroff argues: 
It is difficult to imagine anything more destructive of liberty than a 
government with the authority to override parental choices 
concerning the development and values of the next generation—
particularly religious or moral values. One of the keys to 
maintaining American democratic institutions has been the freedom 
 
 135. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 503 (1977)), overruled on other grounds by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 136. Id. at 191–92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)). 
 137. Eric A. DeGroff, Parental Rights and Public School Curricula: Revisiting Mozert After 
20 Years, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 83, 108–28 (2009). 
 138. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *446. 
 139. Id. at *450–51 (“The last duty of parents to their children is that of giving them an 
education suitable to their station in life: a duty pointed out by reason, and of far the greatest 
importance of any.”). 
 140. See id. at *451 (“Yet the municipal laws of most countries seem to be defective in this 
point, by not constraining the parent to bestow a proper education upon his children.”). 
 141. DeGroff, supra note 137, at 124 (footnotes omitted). 
 142. See Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious Education, and 
Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 120–22 (2000) (arguing that parental oversight 
of children’s education and development is indispensable to the continuation of a liberal 
republic). 
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of diverse families to choose for themselves what values to hold and 
what course to follow.143 
Because parents have the primary responsibility for raising and 
educating their children, they are in some sense guardians of the 
republic.144 It is therefore both natural—from a biological 
perspective—and beneficial—from a social capital perspective—for 
parents to educate their children.145 This firmly rooted tradition is 
bolstered by the vast body of contemporary social science research 
showing that parents generally act in their children’s best interests 
and can (and should) be entrusted with their primary care.146 
The parental right to direct a child’s moral and religious 
upbringing is especially deserving of strict scrutiny. This facet of 
parental rights necessarily implicates the free exercise clause, in 
addition to substantive due process, because these claims are 
inescapably hybrid. In Employment Division v. Smith,147 the Supreme 
Court noted that strict scrutiny is appropriate for “hybrid claims,” in 
which free exercise claims are conjoined with other fundamental 
rights to challenge a neutral and generally applicable law.148 
Smith’s hybrid rights language has generated considerable 
confusion, controversy, and commentary among the circuits.149 
Though legitimate ambiguity surrounds the scope and application of 
hybrid rights, Smith unambiguously affirms the concept of hybrid 
rights set forth in Wisconsin v. Yoder. In Yoder, the court demanded 
more than a rational basis—and, indeed, arguably applied strict 
 
 143. DeGroff, supra note 137, at 126–27. 
 144. Garnett, supra note 142, at 120–22. 
 145. Moreover, parents are in the best position to educate children. Professor Stephen G. 
Gilles argues that the state’s incentive to act according to its conception of children’s best 
interests is significantly lower than parents’ incentives to act according to their conception of 
their child’s interest. Because parents are more likely to effectively raise their children, 
according to Gilles, the state has an interest in protecting and respecting parental autonomy. 
Gilles, supra note 24, at 953–55. 
 146. See generally id. (citing legal, economic, and social science data supporting the claim 
that parents are properly entrusted with their children’s care). 
 147. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 148. See id. at 881 n.1 (“[W]hen the interests of parenthood are combined with a free 
exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a reasonable relation to 
some purpose within the competency of the State is required . . . .” (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 149. See, e.g., Good, supra note 24, at 662–74 (presenting and discussing the circuits’ divided 
approach to hybrid rights claims); Lechliter, supra note 24, at 2222–34 (outlining and 
categorizing the circuit split regarding hybrid rights). 
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scrutiny150—for the state’s violation of Amish parents’ right to direct 
the religious upbringing of their children.151 Smith did not overrule 
Yoder but instead specifically preserved it. Professor Heather M. 
Good explains: 
The hybrid rights doctrine was created in Smith precisely for the 
purpose of distinguishing, not overruling, earlier precedent. Thus, 
while Smith requires a rational basis test in most situations, it 
implicitly requires a separate test, some form of heightened review, 
for hybrid situations. In articulating a bright-line rule, the Court did 
not overrule previous precedent. Rather, the Court made explicitly 
clear that its previous free exercise jurisprudence remained in 
force.152 
Whatever its other implications, Smith’s hybrid claims language 
preserves Yoder’s heightened scrutiny as the applicable standard for 
parents’ right to direct their children’s moral and religious upbringing. 
Although circuits may disagree about the contours of hybrid rights,153 
they cannot reasonably disagree that a parental right claim conjoined 
with a free exercise claim merits heightened scrutiny. These 
considerations, in addition to the fact that parents’ right to direct their 
children’s moral and educational upbringing satisfies the Court’s 
traditional criteria for applying strict scrutiny,154 strongly support the 
contention that this right merits strict scrutiny review.155 
III.  ANALYZING PARENTAL OBJECTIONS TO SEX-ED 
In Yoder, the Supreme Court arrived at its decision by balancing 
the competing interests of the Amish parents and the state.156 Because 
Yoder represents the Supreme Court’s most comprehensive analysis 
 
 150. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“[W]e must searchingly examine the 
interests that the State seeks to promote by its requirement for compulsory education . . . .”). 
 151. See id. at 233 (“[W]hen the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise 
claim . . . more than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the 
State’ is required to sustain the validity of the State’s requirement under the First 
Amendment.”). 
 152. Good, supra note 24, at 655. 
 153. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra notes 132–46 and accompanying text. 
 155. Because strict scrutiny permits the government to justify actions with a compelling 
interest, heightened review will not remove all limits on parental authority. At a minimum, a 
compelling interest is implicated if parents physically harm their children, regardless of their 
motivation (religious or otherwise). Garnett, supra note 142, at 137–38. 
 156. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214–29. 
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of parental rights claims in the context of education,157 its analytical 
framework is useful for understanding how constitutional law should 
treat parents’ right to direct their children’s moral and religious 
upbringing in the context of public education.158 Rather than inspiring 
judicial discretion, however, Yoder more appropriately informs the 
development of a bright-line rule in favor of granting parental 
exemptions.159 The bright-line rule that follows from Yoder is that 
parents are entitled to exemptions when they object to discrete 
programs or activities in public schools. This Part develops that rule 
by applying the factors set forth in Yoder to sex-ed disputes. 
Section A addresses the nature of parents’ interests in the face of 
public school sex-ed programs. Section B then discusses the state’s 
interest in providing such information and denying exemptions. 
Finally, Section C analyzes the likely ramifications of constitutionally 
required exemptions. 
A.  The Yoder Framework 
Yoder involved a challenge brought by Amish parents against 
Wisconsin’s compulsory education law.160 In evaluating the parents’ 
claim, the court promulgated a balancing test that weighed both 
 
 157. See Daniel J. Rose, Note, Compulsory Education and Parent Rights: A Judicial 
Framework of Analysis, 30 B.C. L. REV. 861, 863 (1989) (noting that Yoder represents a 
balancing framework used by the Supreme Court to analyze education conflicts); cf. Crystal V. 
Hodgson, Note, Coercion in the Classroom: The Inherent Tension Between the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses in the Context of Evolution, 9 NEXUS 171, 182 (2004) (arguing that 
Yoder provides an apt framework for evaluating parental objections to evolution curricula in 
public schools). Compare Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213–36 (employing an extended balancing test that 
measures parental interests against social interests), with Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
534–36 (1925) (discussing parental rights at significantly less length with less painstaking focus 
on balancing parental and social interests), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–403 
(1923) (same). 
 158. Although the Amish parents brought a Free Exercise claim rather than a Fourteenth 
Amendment parental rights claim, the Court’s analysis is applicable because it has since 
construed Yoder as a hybrid claim in which the Free Exercise clause and parental rights worked 
in tandem. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990). Moreover, because the 
Court applied heightened review in Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221, its analysis is applicable to parents’ 
fundamental rights, which at the very least trigger heightened review, if not strict scrutiny, see 
supra Part II.B. 
 159. Because balancing tests confer discretion and spawn unpredictability, a bright-line rule 
more fully comports with the goals of fairness, efficiency, and predictability. See generally 
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (arguing 
that courts should apply bright-line rules rather than discretionary tests). 
 160. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207. 
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parental and state interests.161 The Court also reflected upon the 
nature and implications of the requested relief.162 In granting the 
Amish an exemption, the Court noted that “there is at best a 
speculative gain, in terms of meeting the duties of citizenship, from an 
additional one or two years of compulsory formal education.”163 
The Court granted the exemption not only because it would not 
undermine the state’s interest; it also implicitly furthered that 
interest. The Amish children received an education,164 and the 
exemption did not hamper the state’s administration of public 
schools. After all, the state does not have an interest in being the 
exclusive provider of education.165 Rather, the state’s interest is more 
appropriately described as enabling parents to provide for their 
children’s education—by either providing public schools or 
permitting parents to use alternative education. Perhaps, therefore, 
state and parental interests coincide more than would initially 
appear.166 
B.  Parents’ Interests 
Parents’ interest in their children’s moral and religious 
upbringing is significantly compromised if public schools have 
unilateral authority to introduce young children to and teach them 
about sex.167 First, this authority usurps parents’ ability to decide when 
 
 161. Id. at 214–29. 
 162. Id. at 227. 
 163. Id.; see also id. at 234 (“The record strongly indicates that accommodating the religious 
objections of the Amish by forgoing one, or at most two, additional years of compulsory 
education will not impair the physical or mental health of the child, or result in an inability to be 
self-supporting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way 
materially detract from the welfare of society.”). 
 164. Id. at 223–26. 
 165. Id. at 226 n.14 (“While Jefferson recognized that education was essential to the welfare 
and liberty of the people, he was reluctant to directly force instruction of children ‘in opposition 
to the will of the parent.’” (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Cabell, Sept. 19, 
1817, in 17 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 417, 423–24 (Mem. ed. 1904))); see also Pierce v. 
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all 
governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its 
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”). 
 166. The vast amount of social science research that shows the beneficial value of parental 
involvement in children’s lives also bolsters this assertion. See, e.g., Teresa Stanton Collett, 
Protecting Our Daughters: The Need for the Vermont Parental Notification Law, 26 VT. L. REV. 
101, 130 n.152 (2001) (noting that parental involvement can be used to curb teen sexual 
activity). 
 167. See supra Part II.A. 
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and how to discuss sex with their children. Second, when a school 
advocates a particular message that conflicts with a parent’s message 
at home, it undermines that parent’s ability to direct his child’s 
upbringing. Messages with the government’s imprimatur carry 
particular persuasiveness.168 Hearing divergent messages from parents 
and teachers can be detrimentally confusing, especially for young 
children. As Professor Emily Buss has noted: 
We can trust adults to understand the difference between these 
ceremonial references and more directive endorsements, because 
our understanding of self, and state, and our relationship to the 
state, has matured. Children’s immaturity, in contrast, makes them 
far more vulnerable to a misapprehension of the state message. 
Indeed, it is impossible to entirely disentangle their emerging 
understanding of self from their interpretation of these messages 
from the state.169 
C.  State Interests 
The state has an interest in educating its students to be 
productive and engaged citizens.170 A school’s purview of authority 
therefore extends beyond mere reading, writing, and arithmetic. To 
that end, schools must retain some degree of autonomy to set and 
administer a curriculum for effective education.171 The state’s interest 
 
 168. E.g., McCreary Co. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“In 
the marketplace of ideas, the government has vast resources and special status.”); Edwards v. 
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1987); see also Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 100–01 (1st Cir. 
2008) (“The impressionability of young school children has been noted as a relevant factor in 
the Establishment Clause context. . . . We see no principled reason why the age of students 
should be irrelevant in Free Exercise Clause cases.”). 
 169. Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child and the State, 2004 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 51. 
 170. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, education is perhaps 
the most important function of state and local governments. . . . [I]t is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.”); 
see also, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (“[P]ublic schools are vitally 
important ‘in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens,’ and as vehicles for 
‘inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.’” 
(quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979))). 
 171. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (“There is no doubt as to the 
power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable 
regulations for the control and duration of its basic education.”); Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. 
Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that state and local authorities retain 
control over public school curricula and issues relating to “how a public school teaches 
[children]”). 
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is therefore double-faceted and includes both effective administration 
and the substantive content of educational materials. 
The state’s interest in administrative efficiency is fairly 
uncontroversial.172 To operate with any efficiency, a school’s decisions 
cannot be subject to inexhaustible parental scrutiny and veto. The 
fact that schools have general administrative authority, however, does 
not constitute a compelling basis for encroaching on parental rights in 
all situations.173 The nature of the interest in a given context is 
therefore crucial: in other words, the relevant question is not whether 
a state has administrative authority, but how much an exemption 
would undermine that authority in a given situation. 
The more complicated aspect of parental objections pertains to a 
state’s interest in teaching the objectionable material. Twenty-one 
states require public schools to educate their students about sexuality, 
disease prevention, or reproduction, and ten states permit (but do not 
require) such instruction.174 Given the rise of sexually transmitted 
diseases among American youth,175 the state has a public health 
interest in ensuring that citizens know about sex and disease 
prevention.176 What is less clear, however, is whether this interest is 
appropriately vindicated through the public school system and at the 
expense of parental rights. 
 
 172. E.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213; Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923). 
 173. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (“Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are 
at stake, however, we cannot accept such a sweeping claim [that a state’s interest in compulsory 
education is compelling]; despite its admitted validity in the generality of cases, we must 
searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to promote by its requirement . . . and the 
impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish 
exemption.”). Moreover, administrative efficiency arguments do not typically prevail in the face 
of other civil rights claims. See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 
192 (1999) (rejecting the government’s administrative efficiency defense in the context of voter 
communication); United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 473 (1995) 
(rejecting the government’s administrative efficiency defense to a free speech challenge). The 
disparate deference afforded to administrative concerns in different contexts reflects a general 
judicial disrespect for parental rights. 
 174. Simchi-Levi, supra note 125, at 770. 
 175. See Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, STD Surveillance 2006, 
http://www.cdc.gov/std/stats06/adol.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2009) (“Recent estimates suggest 
that while representing 25% of the ever sexually active population, 15 to 24 years of age acquire 
nearly half of all new STDs.”). 
 176. E.g., Brough, supra note 24, at 411–12. 
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Courts generally deem any interest within a school’s educational 
mission legitimate.177 Courts should be cautious when second-guessing 
a school’s determination of its educational mission,178 but those 
determinations should not be accepted blindly. Because schools 
articulate their own educational mission, their authority has no 
ascertainable limit. Justice Alito has noted: 
The “educational mission” of the public schools is defined by the 
elected and appointed public officials with authority over the 
schools and by the school administrators and faculty. As a result, 
some public schools have defined their educational missions as 
including the inculcation of whatever political and social views are 
held by the members of these groups.179 
In his concurring opinion in Mozert, Judge Boggs highlighted 
similar problems: “The school board recognizes no limitation on its 
power to require any curriculum, no matter how offensive or one-
sided, and to expel those who will not study it, so long as it does not 
violate the Establishment Clause.”180 
The cases discussed in Part I.C illustrate the line-drawing 
problems caused by educational mission defenses. The Ninth Circuit 
held that the psychological survey in Fields fell within the school’s 
educational mission because it was related to protecting children’s 
mental health.181 Whatever legitimate interest a state has in sex-ed is 
considerably diminished when a school provides surveys or directs 
information to young children.182 When students are in elementary 
 
 177. See, e.g., Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1210 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The 
defendants argue that the survey was intended to gauge the mental health of the School 
District’s students . . . . In this respect, the School District’s interest in the mental health of its 
students falls well within the state’s authority as parens patriae. As such, the School District may 
legitimately play a role in the care and nurture of children entrusted to them for schooling.”). 
 178. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235 (“[C]ourts are not school boards or legislatures, and are 
ill-equipped to determine the ‘necessity’ of discrete aspects of a State’s program of compulsory 
education.”). 
 179. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2637 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring). In Morse, the 
Court rejected the school district’s argument that its censorship authority extended as far as its 
educational mission. See id. (“The opinion of the Court does not endorse the broad argument 
advanced by petitioners and the United States that the First Amendment permits public school 
officials to censor any student speech that interferes with a school’s ‘educational mission.’”). 
 180. Mozert v. Hawkins Co. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1073 (6th Cir. 1987) (Boggs, J., 
concurring). 
 181. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1211. 
 182. This is because, in contrast to elementary school students, “sex education for 
adolescents involves pupils who are in a position to put what they learn into practice.” Kenneth 
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school, any benefits of compulsory sex-ed are considerably offset 
when that education is provided over parents’ objections or without 
their knowledge.183 And in the case of surveys like those at issue in 
Fields and C.N., the student participants were not “learning” in any 
traditional sense.184 The usual information flow is reversed when 
children are providing information to their schools.185 In these 
situations, the state’s educational interest is attenuated.186 
Given that parents and schools both have interests in providing 
children with sex-ed, the relevant and decisive factor appears to be 
the nature of the exemption and its effect on the school’s interest. 
D.  Granting Relief 
The foregoing analysis is readily adaptable to cases in which 
parents object to discrete activities or programs187 that undermine 
their authority to direct the moral and religious upbringing of their 
children by teaching them about sex. Parents’ interest in directing 
their children’s moral and religious upbringing falls within the scope 
of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. When parents object to 
discrete activities or programs that are easily isolated from the rest of 
 
L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conflict, and the Socialization of Children, 91 CAL. L. REV. 967, 997 
(2003). 
 183. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. Moreover, requiring parental consent would 
strengthen a school’s interest in sex-ed programs. It is rational and useful to involve parents in 
sex-ed, and notifying parents—even those who would give consent readily—can only help 
facilitate further discussion. See NAT’L GUIDELINES TASK FORCE, GUIDELINES FOR 
COMPREHENSIVE SEXUALITY EDUCATION 20 (3d ed. 2004), available at http://www.siecus. 
org/pubs/guidelines/guidelines.pdf (announcing, inter alia, the following values inherent in the 
guidelines: “Parents should be the primary sexuality educators of their children”; “Families 
should provide children’s first education about sexuality”; and “Families should share their 
values about sexuality with their children”). Permitting parents to excuse their children is 
unlikely to harm whatever pedagogical interest a school has in teaching elementary school 
children about sex because the children will encounter the information at a later (and arguably 
more appropriate) age. 
 184. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209–10 (“[T]he students who were questioned may or may not 
have ‘learned’ anything from the survey itself and may or may not have been ‘taught’ anything 
by the questions they were asked . . . .”). 
 185. Davis, supra note 24, at 1139–40. 
 186. The school’s interest in children’s mental health is at least a step removed from its 
interest in teaching the core disciplines of reading, writing, and arithmetic. 
 187. Discrete activities and programs are easily isolated from the rest of the curriculum. 
Some examples include surveys, assemblies, and sex-ed classes. When parents object to more 
pervasive practices in the school, then the school’s burden in providing an exemption 
correspondingly increases. See infra Part IV. 
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the curriculum, they are constitutionally entitled to notice and an 
opportunity to exempt their children.188 
This Note has discussed the interests of both parents and the 
state.189 Parents have an interest in guiding their child’s moral and 
religious development, and instruction on or exposure to sexual 
matters implicates that interest. Schools also have an interest in 
educating children about sexual health. But when parents request an 
exemption, they do not necessarily undermine the school’s interest. If 
parents truly are best equipped to facilitate children’s moral well-
being,190 then the state has an interest in enabling parents to direct 
their children’s moral and religious upbringing. In these instances, as 
in Yoder, an exemption would be especially appropriate. 
Even if parent and state interests conflict,191 however, the de 
minimis burden that exemptions entail justifies vindicating parental 
interests.192 In cases involving objections to discrete events, the 
school’s interest is slight.193 Parents in these cases have not requested 
that their views be taught in the classroom, but only that they be 
notified and given an opportunity to exempt their children. In cases 
like Brown, in which the exemption applies only to a short assembly, 
a school can hardly claim substantial administrative disruption if 
 
 188. Parental requests for notice have particularly strong constitutional backing because 
they inherently implicate procedural due process concerns. Because procedural due process 
requires notice and a hearing, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975), constitutional law 
implicitly entitles parents to notice before public schools teach children about matters that 
conflict with the parental province, cf. Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 584 
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“‘[T]he protection of the individual against arbitrary 
action . . . [is] the very essence of due process,’ but where the State is allowed to act secretly 
behind closed doors and without any notice to those who are affected by its actions, there is no 
check against the possibility of such arbitrary action.” (alterations and omission in original) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956) (internal 
quotation marks omitted))). Practically, this would require a school to notify parents about its 
curriculum and programs, which—in an era of ready access to information via the Internet—
should not pose a significant burden. 
 189. See supra Part III.B–C. 
 190. E.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944); Gilles, supra note 24, at 961–
65; see supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text. 
 191. Sex-ed programs in public schools are arguably a response to parents’ failure to 
adequately educate their children about sex. Brough, supra note 24, at 410. 
 192. For example, in Brown, the school had a policy of notification and exemption which it 
failed to follow in the situation giving rise to the parents’ claims, Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer 
Prods., 68 F.3d 525, 530 (1st Cir. 1995), so the policy is presumptively not burdensome. See 
supra note 173. 
 193. See supra notes 183–86 and accompanying text. 
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parents excuse their children.194 A similarly slight burden arises when 
surveys are at issue, as in C.N. and Fields. Even for multi-week health 
classes, however, the school’s burden is minimal.195 There is no 
financial burden,196 and any administrative burden is apparently small. 
The greatest burden that a school can assert, therefore, is that 
exemptions undermine its educational mission—which, as discussed, 
is an inherently circumspect perimeter for authority.197 
Moreover, granting an exemption serves the broader purpose of 
making public schools more hospitable to diverse viewpoints.198 
Although objecting parents are often viewed contemptuously as 
intolerant naysayers, their objections are grounded in firmly held 
religious and philosophical beliefs. It is ironic that schools would 
prefer to abandon their mission of educating these children at all, 
rather than to accommodate them in narrow and specific instances.199 
When parents’ only options are to subject their children to 
objectionable lessons and information, or to remove their children 
from public school, then they often face a Hobson’s choice.200 
Moreover, if these children are channeled into alternative educational 
systems, then the majority loses an opportunity to engage minority 
 
 194. Indeed, in Brown, the school had a policy requiring notification and an opportunity for 
exemption but failed to follow that policy in the situation giving rise to the claim. Brown, 68 
F.3d at 530. 
 195. Even in Mozert, in which parents requested an exemption from an entire course, the 
school initially granted exemptions—apparently without any ensuing administrative burdens. 
Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 196. Courts have held that the parental right must give way when the consequences would 
cause significant financial burdens to the school. See, e.g., Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 
135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding a school’s policy that prohibited part-time 
attendance based on funding constrictions on the ground that “decisions as to how to allocate 
scarce resources, as well as what curriculum to offer or require, are uniquely committed to the 
discretion of local school authorities”). 
 197. See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text. 
 198. Good, supra note 24, at 677–78. 
 199. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1074 (Boggs, J., concurring) (“Though the [school] board 
recognized that their allegedly compelling interests in shaping the education of Tennessee 
children could not be served at all if they drove the children from the school, the board felt it 
better not be associated with any hybrid [critical reading] program.”); Good, supra note 24, at 
678 (“The upside is that the child and parent are free to exercise their beliefs, but the downside 
is that those same beliefs become hidden from both majority understanding and critique. Such a 
system certainly cannot be said to promote diversity and tolerance.”). 
 200. Good, supra note 24, at 676; see also Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2637 (2007) 
(Alito, J., concurring) (“Most parents, realistically, have no choice but to send their children to 
public school and little ability to influence what occurs in the school.”). 
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beliefs.201 The Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the value of 
diversity in education,202 and religious and philosophical diversity 
makes a valuable contribution to education. 
Some courts have expressed concern that an exemption for sex-
ed programs will open the floodgates for “countless moral, religious, 
or philosophical objections that parents might have to other [school] 
decisions.”203 So long as a parent objects to a discrete program, 
however, there is indeed no constitutional basis for granting or 
denying relief based on the rationale underlying that objection.204 An 
exemption from an assembly or survey discussing violence would not 
be any more burdensome than exemptions from sex-ed in similarly 
discrete and isolated situations.205 A problem arises, however, when 
parents’ objections—regardless of their bases—are so pervasive that 
an exemption would deprive children of an effective education. 
IV.  THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES 
When parental objections are not tied to discrete events, a court-
ordered remedy becomes less feasible. Although courts may grant 
exemptions without stepping too heavily on schools’ toes, judges are 
ill-equipped to craft educational policy.206 Courts are appropriately 
reluctant to interfere with a public school’s determination of 
 
 201. Good, supra note 24, at 677–78; see also Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1073–74 (Boggs, J., 
concurring) (lamenting that, absent accommodation, public schools are “entitled to say, ‘my way 
or the highway’”). 
 202. E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003). 
 203. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 204. When a parent’s objection (whatever its basis) is to a series of classes, however, then an 
exemption may be inappropriate if it would effectively deprive the child of an education. See 
infra Part IV. Thus a parent’s objection to a semester-long sex-ed class (which is arguably 
beyond the school’s core educational functions, see supra Part III.C) will more likely be 
vindicated than a parents’ philosophical objection to a math class. 
 205. For a discussion of the logic underlying slippery slope arguments, see generally Eugene 
Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003). Specifically, the 
fear that granting an exemption in one instance would lead to other requests for exemptions is 
unpersuasive if there is nothing problematic about those additional exemptions—and indeed, if 
those additional exemptions foster greater respect for diverse viewpoints then they are actually 
desirable. See id. at 1104–05 (“When decision A alters people’s attitudes about B, this alteration 
may be part of a good learning process.”). 
 206. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) (“[C]ourts are not school boards or 
legislatures, and are ill-equipped to determine the ‘necessity’ of discrete aspects of a State’s 
program of compulsory education.”). Moreover, permitting courts to craft educational policy 
would be highly discretionary and therefore give rise to unpredictable and potentially arbitrary 
results. See supra note 159 and text accompanying note 179. 
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curriculum requirements,207 and they typically reject parents’ attempts 
to exempt children from entire classes, especially when a school has 
already offered a reasonable compromise.208 In some cases, parental 
objections are so extensive that granting an exemption is tantamount 
to denying their child an education.209 When parents’ objections are 
pervasive and amorphous (that is, when they cannot be tied to a 
discrete, tangible event), exemptions provide an unsatisfactory 
remedy. 
Parker v. Hurley,210 a First Circuit case, illustrates the problems 
that arise with pervasive objections. Parents whose kindergarten and 
second-grade children were given books depicting same-sex 
relationships challenged a public school’s authority to do so.211 The 
court rejected the parents’ claims, holding that the parents’ Meyer-
Pierce right does not entitle parents to an exemption from certain 
books used in public schools212 and that no free exercise violation had 
occurred.213 The court distinguished Brown due to factual and legal 
 
 207. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(reversing the district court’s grant of an exemption for children whose parents objected to a 
“critical reading” class); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 402 (D.N.H. 1974) (denying objecting 
parents the right to exempt their children from a public school’s proposed “Health Education” 
course). 
 208. In Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003), a father sought to exempt his 
son from a public school’s seventh grade health class requirement. Id. at 135. The school had 
granted exemptions for the six classes dealing with sexuality but required attendance at the 
other classes. Id. at 136. Despite the father’s religious and moral objections to the school 
teaching his son about drugs and tobacco, id. at 137–38, the court held that it would be “difficult 
or impossible” for a public school to meet the educational needs of its students if every parent 
had a fundamental right to dictate his child’s curriculum, id. at 141. 
 209. See Davis, 385 F. Supp. at 401 (“If these children are allowed to leave the classroom 
whenever audio-visual equipment is being used, then they will be denied an effective 
education.”). In Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974), parents challenged a public 
school’s use of audiovisual equipment as violating their parental rights and free exercise of 
religion. Id. at 398. The court denied the parents’ request for an exemption from the use of all 
audiovisual equipment, but did grant an exemption when audiovisual equipment was being used 
for entertainment rather than educational purposes. Id. at 401. 
 210. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 211. Id. at 92–93. The parents, however, objected to any mention of same-sex relationships 
to their children. See id. at 105 (“In the present case, the plaintiffs claim that the exposure of 
their children, at these young ages and in this setting, to ways of life contrary to the parents’ 
religious beliefs violates their ability to direct the religious upbringing of their children. . . . The 
heart of plaintiffs’ free exercise claim is a claim of ‘indoctrination’: that the state has put 
pressure on their children to endorse an affirmative view of gay marriage and has thus undercut 
the parents’ efforts to inculcate their children with their own opposing religious views.”). 
 212. Id. at 102. 
 213. Id. at 99. 
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differences,214 but nevertheless held that parents do not have a right to 
limit public schools’ decisions to expose children to matters relating 
to sex so long as a school acts within its educational mission.215 
Parker is an especially intriguing case because of the 
pervasiveness of the parents’ objection. Their complaint was not 
limited to a specific class, event, or educational practice but was 
instead a much broader objection to the discussion of same-sex 
relationships.216 Although same-sex relationships may raise questions 
among young children, merely referencing them cannot be called sex 
education.217 Unlike cases involving discrete events, a school cannot 
easily predict when or how the subject of same-sex relationships may 
arise in the course of a school day. 
Parker illustrates the broader problem that arises when parents 
object not to a specific incident but rather to the general worldview 
promulgated by a public school curriculum. The nature of this 
objection renders notice or exemption impossible. Parental 
notification would impose insurmountable administrative and 
logistical challenges on schools, and even if exemptions were feasible, 
they would necessarily be so broad that children would be deprived of 
an education. Such pervasive objections simply cannot be tackled by 
schools, and courts are ill-equipped to devise solutions. 
In these situations, parents’ obvious choice is to remove their 
children from the public school system. The problem with that 
solution, however, is that most parents do not have the economic 
wherewithal to pursue alternate education, whether at home or 
through private school.218 For the vast majority of parents, therefore, 
the “choice” to remove their children from public school is illusory. 
And yet it is these parents whose rights are most threatened.219 A 
constitutional right with no practical remedy leaves these parents with 
 
 214. Id. at 100–01 (noting that Brown involved an assembly for high school students whereas 
Parker involved the education of elementary school students). 
 215. Id. at 96 n.7. 
 216. Id. at 90; see supra note 211. 
 217. This is particularly true in Massachusetts, where same-sex marriage is recognized 
legally. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 970–71 (2003) (Greaney, J., 
concurring) (recognizing same-sex marriage on the basis of an equal protection analysis). 
Indeed, in the context of Massachusetts’s marriage laws, these parents’ claim seems especially 
futile and difficult to accommodate. 
 218. Good, supra note 24, at 676; see also Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2637 (2007) 
(Alito, J., concurring) (“Most parents, realistically, have no choice but to send their children to 
public school and little ability to influence what occurs in the school.”). 
 219. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
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little recourse. The stakes are high not only for parents but also for 
society.220 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Richard Garnett explains why parents’ right to control 
the moral and religious upbringing of their children must be taken 
seriously: 
[I]t looks like the emerging consensus in political theory is that the 
poet, William Ross Wallace, was right (as was the creepy movie): 
The hand that rocks the cradle rules the world. In other words, those 
who decide what children may and should learn thereby shape, if not 
determine, those children’s character and commitments, as well as 
those of the community.221 
Because parental involvement is vital to the health of a liberal 
republic, and because children’s flourishing is inextricably related to 
parental involvement, public schools cannot unilaterally usurp the 
parental role. When parents object to discrete programs and events, 
they are entitled to notice and an opportunity to exempt their child. 
Without this right, a parent’s “choice” to send his child to public 
school is meaningless. But this remedy has limitations and cannot 
offer a satisfactory resolution to the infinite hypothetical conflicts that 
may arise between parents and schools. 
At its core, the inevitable conflict between parents and schools 
favors school choice. If parents were able to take their money with 
them, then their right to leave public schools would be significantly 
more meaningful. This is a job for state legislatures and school 
districts. If parents can exercise greater choice, then administrative 
concerns will dissipate as parents freely select the educational 
environment most consonant with their values and preferences, 
largely eliminating the need for accommodation through exemptions. 
School choice is a truly liberal solution to the goals of publicly funded 
liberal education. It respects every viewpoint by actually enabling 
parents to direct their children’s education and upbringing according 
to their individual values and beliefs. This is a sharp contrast to the 
current system, which gives lip service to parental rights while 
silencing any attempt to exercise them. 
 
 220. See supra Part II.A; supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text. 
 221. Garnett, supra note 142, at 121. 
